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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In regard to DARRELL WAYNE 
MORRIS, Witness/ Appellant. 
ST ATE OF UT AH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant. 
Appellate Case No. 20150187-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT. 
R. APP. P. 3 over this appeal from the Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell 
Wayne Morris ("Judgment"), dated February 12, 2015 by the Honorable Derek M. Pullan 
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, sentencing Morris to a prison term 
of thirty (30) days in the county jail to run consecutive with his prison sentence and 
ordering him to pay a fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, ($1 ,000.00) for his 
conviction of contempt. A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
ISSUE I: 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err when it failed to address the harm issue Morris 
raised in his Motion to Quash, of being at a substantial risk of bodily 
harm or death if he testified in the Logue trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate review ofa denial ofa motion to quash 
a subpoena is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Grand Jury 
Subpoenas Dated Dec. 7 and 8, Issues to Bob Stover, Chief of Albuquerque Police 
Department v. United States, 1100, see also Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 
1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 13 F.3d 1293, 1295 
(9th Cir. 1994). However, if the denial of a request to quash rises to a constitutional 
violation, the matter is reviewed de novo. Id., citing United States v. Thody, 978 F.2d 625, 
628 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 907, 115 S.Ct. 273, 130 L.Ed.2d 190 (1994). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by the filing of Morris' Motion to 
Quash Witness Subpoena for Darrell Wayne Morris on January 28, 2015. RL:02050-
02054, and the argument of such Motion on January 30, 2015. R01294:5-54. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial'. court err in determining that Morris had no Fifth 
Amendment privilege to assert as a reason to not testify at the Logue 
trial? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional issues ... are questions oflaw that we 
review for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, if25, 100 P.3d 1177. 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by it being raised before the trial 
court in the Motion to Quash pleading and during oral arguments on January 30, 2015, as 
to whether Morris was going to testify. The trial court ruled on such issue. 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V states as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
B. UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 states as follows: 
(a)(l) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter 
before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal 
investigation or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom 
an information is filed, the prosecuting attorney on his or her own 
initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an 
information or indictment is to be tried ... An attorney admitted to practice 
in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a 
subpoena as an officer of the court ... (b) The court may quash or modify 
the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable .... (c) Applicability 
of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions of Rule 45, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the content, issuance, and 
service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are consistent 
with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
C. UT. R. CIV. P. 8l(e) states, "These rules of procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or 
constitutional requirement. 
D. UT. R. CIV. P. 45 states as follows: 
Every subpoena shall: (a)(l)(A) issue from the court in which the action 
is pending; (a)(l)(B) state the title and case number of the action, the 
name of the court from which it is issued, and the name and address of 
the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena; (a)(l )(C) 
3 
command each person to whom it is directed (a)(l)(C)(i) to appear and 
give testimony at a trial, hearing or deposition, ... (a)(l)(D) if an 
appearance is required, specify the date, time and place for the appearance 
... (b )( 1) A subpoena may be served by any person who is at least 18 years 
of age and not a party to the case. Service of a subpoena upon the person 
to whom it is directed shall be made as provided in Rule 4(d). (b)(2) If 
the subpoena commands a person's appearance, the party or attorney 
responsible for issuing the subpoena shall tender with the subpoena the 
fees for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law. When the 
subpoena is issued on behalf of the United States, or this state, or any 
officer or agency of either, fees and mileage need not be tendered .. . (e)(3) 
The person subject to the subpoena or a non-party affected by the 
subpoena may object under Rule 37 if the subpoena: ... (e)(5) If objection 
is made, or if a party requests a protective order, the party or attorney 
responsible for issuing the subpoena is not entitled to compliance but may 
request an order to compel compliance under Rule 37(a). The objection 
or request shall be served on the other parties and on the person subject 
to the subpoena. An order compelling compliance shall protect the person 
subject to or affected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm. 
The court may quash or modify the subpoena. 
E. United States Department of Justice Petite Policy: Dual and Successive 
Prosecution Policy ("Petite Policy"). United States Attorneys Manual, 
Title 9: Criminal, 9-2.031(1). 
F. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-racketeering, 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1111-murder 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1117--conspiracy to murder 
Other relevant U.S. Code provisions 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 1, 2011 , Darrell Wayne Morris ("Morris") and Danny Leroy Logue 
("Logue") were charged by separate Information with Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated 
Murder, a first degree felony; Aggravated Murder, a first degree felony; Purchase, 
Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a second degree felony; 
Obstructing Justice, a second degree felony; seven (7) counts of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, all first degree felonies ; Manufacture of a Vehicle 
4 
' 
Compartment for Contraband, a third degree felony; and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony. RM :00009; RL :000007. 1 
A joint preliminary hearing was held on August 31, 2012, after which the trial court 
took the matter under advisement. RM:00066; RL:000044. The trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Bindover on September 11, 2012 binding over both 
Morris and Logue for trial. RM:00109; RL:00085. On November 19, 2012 Morris filed a 
Motion to Quash the Bindover. RM:00125. On November 20, 2012 Logue filed a Motion 
to Quash the Bindover. RL:R00102. On December 7, 2012 the State filed a Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Quash Bindover. RM:00157; RL:00120. On 
August 21, 2013 the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Defendant 's Motions to Quash Bindover upholding its bindover decision. RM:00203; 
RL:00241. 
On September 10, 2013 Logue filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome 
of Interlocutory Appeal; and Memorandum in Support. RL:00267. On September 12, 
2013 Morris and Logue filed a joint Petition for Interlocutory appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court. RM:00219; RL:00274. Such Interlocutory Petition was later denied. On 
September 24, 2013 Morris filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Interlocutory 
Petition. RM:00246. 
'This matter began as a consolidated matter. Thus, there are two (2) records which must be 
cited in this matter. The record for Morris is referenced herein as "RM" and the record for 
Logue is referenced as "RL." 
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After the denial of the Interlocutory Petition the following Pre-trial Motions were 
l. State's Motion in Limine to Admit Co-Conspirator Statements, filed February 
27, 2014, RM:00300, RL:00354; a Response in Opposition was filed on April 
15, 2014, RM:00588, RL:00764; 
2. State's Motion in Limine to Admit Yuri Lara's Statement "Andy's Dead" filed 
February 27, 2014, RM:00359, RL:00308; a Response in Opposition was filed 
on April 15, 2014, RM:00574, RL:00801; 
3. State's Motion to Allow Co-Conspirator Liability Argument and Instruction, 
filed February 27, 2014, RM:00368, RL:00317; a Response in Opposition was 
filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00609, RL:0787; 
4. State's Motion in Limine to Admit the Transcript of Yuri Lara's Entry of Plea 
and/or Audio Record Thereof and/or His Written Statement in Advance of Plea 
Document at Trial; filed February 27, 2014, RM:00325, RL:00376; a Response 
was filed April 15, 2014, RM:00641, RL:0801; 
5. Motion in Limine to Enlarge Time Period to File Pre-Trial Motions, to Continue 
Evidentiary Hearing, and to Continue Jury Trial, filed February 27, 2014, 
RM:00329, RL:00308; 
6. State's Motion for Discovery, filed on March 17, 2014, RM:00341, RL:00392; 
Response in Opposition filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00624, RL:00794; 
6 
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7. State's Motion for Admission of Certain Photographs into Evidence, filed March 
20, 2014, RM:00352, RL:00403; Response in Opposition filed April 15, 2014, 
RM:00633, RL:00748; 
8. State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Robin Jacksons Prior Thefts; filed March 
28, 2014, RM:00354, RL:00405; Response filed April 15, 2014, RM:00617, 
RL:00737; 
9. Motion in Li mine to Exclude Witnesses filed April 1, 2014, RM:003 56-003 82, 
RL:00593-00621 , Response filed April 15, 2014, RM:00533, RL:00673; 
10. Motion in Limine to Exclude Cell Phone Tower Records and Request for 
Hearing Pursuant to Ur. R. EVID. 702, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00384, 00511, 
RL :00480, 00591; Memorandum in Opposition filed April 17, 2014, 
RM:00665, RL:00811; 
I I.Motion for Change of Venue, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00386, RL:00648; 
Memorandum in Opposition filed April 15, 2014, RM:00521, RL:00700; 
12. Motion for Discovery Order Directing State to Provide Prosecution Witnesses 
Criminal Histories and Plea Agreements in this Matter and Memorandum in 
Support, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00396-00410, RL:00463-00478; Response 
filed on April 15, 2014, RM:00564, RL:00794; 
13.Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts and Convictions Pursuant to UT. R. EVID 
404(b) filed April 1, 2014, RM:000412-00426, RL:00482-00496; Response 
filed on April 17, 2014, RM:00675, RL:00821; 
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14. Motion to Sever Co-Defendants Criminal Trial, filed April 1, 2014, RM:00428-
450, RL:00623-00646; Response filed on April 18, 2014, RM:00693, RL:00839; 
15.Motion to Suppress Cellular Telephone Information, April 1, 2014, RM:00452-
503; RL:00407-00459, Opposition filed April 15, 2014, RM:00533, RL:00712; 
16.Motion in Limine to Permit Defendant to Wear Business Attire and to conceal 
visible evidence of Defendants Incarceration and Restraints at Trial; filed April 
1, 2015, RM:00513-00516, RL:00665; Response filed on April 15, 2014, 
RM:00567, RL:00715; and 
17. Brief re: Motion in Limine to Exclude Cell Phone Tower Records; filed July 14, 
2014, RM: 01174-01196; RL:1237-1261. 
The following Motions were filed in Logue's case but not in the Morris' matter: 
1. Motion in Limine to Prohibit Description, Use, or References to Gangs and 
Incarceration; RL:01478; Memorandum in Opposition was filed on December 
22, 2014, RL:01545; 
2. Motion to Disclose CI Packet on William Thompson, filed April 2, 2014, 
RL:00668, Response was filed on April 18, 2014, RL:00845. 
On May 21, 2014 the Ruling and Order Re: State's Motion for Discovery was filed, 
RM:00850, RL:01002. On July 14, 2014, the following orders were filed: 
1. Order Excluding Retail Theft Conviction, RM:01201, RL:1290; 
2. Order Denying Motion to Exclude Witnesses, RM:01207, RL:1281; 
3. Order Admitting Co-conspirator Statements in Part, RM:0 1217; RL 1271; 
4. Order Denying Motion to Suppress CSL,;RM:01221, RL:01285; 
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5. Order Denying Change of Venue; RM:01225, RL:1275; 
6. Order Admitting Statement Andy's Dead, RM:01231, RL:01293; 
On July 15, 2014 the Second Amended Information was entered for Morris. It 
charged Morris with Manslaughter, a second degree felony; Obstructing Justice, a second 
degree felony; and Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by 
Restricted Person, a third degree felony. RM:01234. On July 15, 2014 the Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel was filed 
("Plea Agreement"), RM:R01244. On July 15, 2014, the Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment was entered. RM:RO 1228. 
On August 14, 2014 the Ruling and Order Re: State's Motion to Allow Co-
Conspirator Liability Argument and Instruction was entered. RM:01263. On September 
23, 2014 the Motion to Examine Witnesses Confined in Prison was filed. RM:01265; 
RL:01431, 1490. 
On July 14, 2014 the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the State's Motion 
to Admit Co-Conspirator Statements was entered. RM:01271, RL:01423, 01458, 01468. 
The Order to Examine Witnesses Confined in Prison was entered on November 21, 2014. 
RL:01466. 
On December 15, 2014 the Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Brandon Wright and 
Memorandum in Support was filed. RL:01513. Such Motion indicated that on October 
21, 2014 Wright had an interview with law enforcement indicating that he had information 
relevant to this matter. RL:001512. Wright indicated that he had previous affiliation with 
a gang called Silent Aryan Warriors ("SAW"), from which he claimed to have retired 
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before his last parole in 2006. Id. Wright indicated that when he was informed when he 
returned to prison that SAW was under new management and he would be required to 
'"push steel" and that he could not retire. Id. 
The motion to exclude Wright's testimony specifically stated as follows: 
5. In a letter written by Wright and disclosed by the prosecution to counsel 
herein, Wright states that he was approached by SAW upon reaching 
population in prison and told that SAW was under new management and 
that he would be called upon to "push steel", which was their new focus. 
Wright allegedly reminded them of his "retirement" from the gang and 
they told him that it did not work that way anymore. A copy of the letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
6. Wright further states in the letter as follows: 
Id. 
I was also recently ordered to carry out a stabbing by someone who 
told me if I did not go through with it he would have to send me out 
sideways. He added emphasis that he was another breed of killer and 
that he is in charge now. He told me he has already ordered two other 
stabbings that have been carried out here in the prison in the last 
year ... He told me details about his currently pending murder that I 
think only the killer could possibly know and so I need you to please 
ask the Utah County Prosecutor to come and talk to me ASAP. He 
provided me with the shank and told me how to do it. . .Instead of 
carrying out my order I created a big (obvious) commotion (hitting 
doors, etc.) and ensured immediate officers attention was drawn to the 
situation. I was brought to Uinta II for possession of the shank ... 
7. Wright's letter concludes with him making an offer in exchange for 
providing information, stating specifically as follows: 
RL1510-l l. 
All I ask is that I be permitted to go to Olympus after I supply all info 
and do whatever controlled buys or stings that are requested; be 
allowed to roll up my own stuff so it's not pilfered again by inmates; 
immunity; and that I get consideration for a special attention to the 
Board of Pardons to request termination (my date is next year) 
because I will be on gang hit lists here and will want to leave Utah for 
good. 
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In his interview Wright allegedly told law enforcement some specifics about this 
matter that he had learned from Logue. RL:001511. Wright told law enforcement that 
Logue and "Wicked," which is an alias for Morris, went to beat someone up, parked away 
from the house, approached the house, and walked on the front lawn. RL:001510. Wright 
indicated the individual they were looking for was on the front porch on his phone. Id. 
The individual told Wicked and Logue that he would call police if they came any closer. 
Id. Wright told law enforcement that Logue then shot him, but that Logue had acted 
impulsively and did not mean for it to happen that way. Id. Wright told law enforcement 
that after the shooting Logue and Wicked "got lost", Logue stashed the gun, Wicked got 
sick at a store, and that Logue returned to where the gun was and switched it for a different 
gun. Id. The Motion argued that Wright testimony should be inadmissible because he 
wanted something for his testimony, could not be trustworthy, and that he could have 
gotten the information from looking over Logue's legal documents. RL:001499. The 
State's Opposition was filed December 29, 2014, RL:01581. On December 17, 2014 the 
State filed its Motion on Procedural Issues. RL:0 1521. On December 31, 2014 the State 
filed its Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Hansen. RL:01605. Logue filed a response 
on January 12, 2015. RL:0 1722. 
On January 28, 2015, the Motion to Quash Witness Subpoena for Darrell Wayne 
Morris was filed. RL:02050-02054. Such Motion argued that the subpoena should be 
quashed based upon his Fifth Amendment privilege. R002049. Morris argues that he is 
subject to both State and Federal prosecution because they are dual sovereigns and thus, 
can bring separate criminal actions. R00204 7. Dual prosecutions do not offend double 
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jeopardy principles. R002046. Morris cannot be prosecuted by the State again for any 
firearm charge related to this matter because he has pied but he could be prosecuted under 
federal statute. Id. Morris also argues that because of this risk and pursuant to UT. R. 
CRIM. P. 14(a)(2) that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and it should 
be quashed. Id. Morris argued that the State had not shown its intent to compel him to 
testify under the grant use of immunity by giving him notice although he had received a 
subpoena and objected to it. R02045. Morris objected based upon his understanding that 
the State had made him two (2) offers the first which required him to testify the second 
which did not. Id. Morris took the second offer so that he would not have to testify. Id. 
Morris argues that the State knew of his objection as earlier as January 16, 2015 and still 
neither the State nor the U.S. Attorney's Office had made an offer of immunity to Morris 
by January 28, 2015. Id. 
Morris indicated that the State indicated that there was no agreement as to testimony 
and that they had reserved the right to subpoena Morris to testify at the Logue trial. Id. 
The State's representations on July 15, 2014 led Morris to reasonably believe that he would 
not be called as a witness. Id. Morris believed if he was called it was only because he 
would be a rebuttal case if Logue testified. R002044. 
More importantly, Morris argued that under UT. R. CRIM. P. 45(c)(5) that he should 
not be compelled or ordered to give testimony because he was at risk of significant harm 
or death from others ifhe testified against Logue. R002043. Thus, Morris argues he should 
not be compelled to testify. R002042. The Certification of Service for service of the 
subpoena on Morris was presented and filed with the trial court on January 30, 2015. 
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On February 3, 2015 the Order on Motion in Limine to Prohibit Description, Use, 
or Reference to Gangs and Incarceration was entered. RL: 02096. In such Order the trial 
court ruled that references to "incarceration" could be used as background information but 
if "undue emphasis" was placed on Logue's incarceration, the Court would revisit the 
Motion. RL:002095. The trial court ruled that no evidence of the gang name "Silent Aryan 
Warriors" or SAW would be permitted. RL:02093. The trial court reserved any ruling on 
the remainder of the Order on Motion in Li mine to Prohibit Description, Use, or Reference 
to Gangs and Incarceration until trial. RL:02092. 
On February 3, 2015 the Order on the Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony 
of Brandon Wright was entered. RL:02103. In such Order the trial court determined that 
Wright's testimony was not so unfair that its admission would violate the fundamental 
conceptions of justice. RL:002099. The trial court determined that the prosecutor had 
"critically important duties relating to jailhouse informants" and ordered that the State 
immediately disclose all information given to it by Wright or the investigators to the 
defense. Id. The State should provide Wright's criminal history and all agreements or 
promises made to Wright for testifying in writing to the defense. RL:002098. The State 
should provide all internal policies within its office for the screening of jailhouse 
informants and their statements or testimony to the defense no later than January 20, 2015. 
Id. If the State failed to do this the trial court reserved the right to revisit the Motion in 
Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Brandon Wright. R002097. 
On February 12, 2015, the Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell 
Wayne Morris; Order of Commitment; Warrant in Aid of Commitment was entered. 
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RL:02215. In such Order the trial court indicated that Morris had been offered immunity 
for his testimony, and that Morris refused to answer questions. RL:02215. The trial court 
also indicated it had found that Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege based upon the 
immunity offer, and that Morris was found in contempt of court for his failure to testify. 
Id. Morris was seated on the stand and he refused to testify. Id. The trial court ordered 
that Morris pay $1,000 fine and serve thirty (30) days in the County jail for such contempt, 
consecutive to the time he was already serving in prison. RL:02214. On March 13, 2015 
Notice of Appeal-Contempt of Court-in regard to Witness Darrell Wayne Morris was filed. 
RL:02254. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Plea and Sentencing: July 15, 2014 
A proposed plea agreement was presented to the trial court. RM01285:3 . The plea 
agreement contained the charges of Manslaughter, a 2nd degree felony; Obstruction of 
Justice, a 2nd degree felony; and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, 
a 3rd degree felony. Id. at p. 3-4. Morris pled guilty to all three (3) counts with the 
sentences for each to run concurrently with each other as well as concurrently to the 
sentence he had previously received in a 2011 forgery case for which Morris was on parole. 
Id. at p. 4. Morris also agreed to be sentenced to prison with no credit for time served. 
Id. at p. 6. The agreement did not indicate that Morris would be subpoenaed to testify. Id. 
at p. 7. The agreement was silent on his willingness to do so. Id. However, the State 
indicated that it was reserving the right to subpoena him if necessary. Id. The State 
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indicated that they did not intend to call him, but that it would depend on how Logue' s trial 
went. Id. 
Morris was subpoenaed to testify at the trial of Danny LeRoy Logue. He appeared 
for that purpose on January 30, 2015. 
B. Trial of Danny Logue on January 302 2015 
Oral arguments were heard by the trial court on Morris' Motion to Quash his trial 
subpoena. R0001294:5. Morris argued that the court either quash his subpoena or modify 
it to limit the State's ability to call him as a rebuttal witness, and only after Logue had 
testified. Id. at p. 5. Morris' counsel indicated that the totality of the circumstances 
included what had occurred in chambers at the hearing on July 15, 2014 and what the State 
represented to the parties at that time. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that he had not 
received an actual subpoena, just verbal notice that the State intended to call Morris on 
January 29, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that he received an 
email from the State on January 16, 2015 indicating that the State had received a hand 
written letter from Morris. Id. Morris' counsel indicated that the letter objected to the 
subpoena based on his understanding that he believed that he had deal with the State not to 
testify. Id. at p. 6. Morris' counsel indicated that Morris acknowledged in his handwritten 
letter that he was told the State wanted to leave the issue of testifying open and Morris said 
no. Id. Counsel indicates the letter is not dated, the issue here is it's a matter of 
transparency. Id. 
Morris's counsel indicated that it asks the court to look at the totality of the 
circumstances, six (6) months previously the State had indicated that it did not intend to 
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call Morris. Id. at p. 7. Morris' counsel indicated that the clear implication from the State 
on July 15, 2014 was that they would call Morris in the rebuttal case depending on what 
Logue does. Id. Morris counsel again indicates that he and co-counsel have not received 
a copy of the subpoena and that Rule 14 does not require that counsel needs to be served a 
copy of the subpoena but points out the matter of State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, i!3 l. Id. 
Counsel indicates that Gonzales indicates what's required with Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 14, and notice to adverse parties. Id. Counsel indicated that Gonzales 
indicated "in evaluation the merits of Mr. Gonzales' interpretation that Criminal Rule 14 
silence regarding notice is intentional, the Court wrote we note that the test of Rule l 4(b ), 
and Rule l 4(b) is referring the victims' records, clearly signals that some notice to adverse 
parties of the issuance of a subpoena is contemplated." Id. Counsel asks the court to rule 
on what is some notice and is the notice verbal. Id. 
Morris' counsel argued that Morris isn't specifically an adverse party to the Logue 
matter, but that he is adverse and that he was a co-defendant, who pled out and was 
sentenced and that he then became an adverse party. Id. at p. 8. Counsel indicates that on 
July 15, 2014 when he entered a plea the State was not going to call him. Id. Counsel 
believes the sticking point is the plea negotiations. Id. Counsel indicates that generally 
evidence of plea negotiations are inadmissible under U.R.E. Rule 408. Id. However, 
counsel indicates there are exceptions to this rule and argues that Morris' understanding or 
the affect of what was represented to him is relevant and admissible under the exception to 
Rule 408 in that his understanding was that he had two (2) offers from the State one to 
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testify and one not to testify. Id. at p. 8. Morris specifically accepted the offer to not 
testify. Id. 
Morris' counsel indicated he informed the State this is the offer the Morris wanted 
and there was a major dispute and they came to court. On July 15, 2014, there was no 
agreement on testimony or no testimony but Morris' understanding of the effect of the offer 
was that he would not testify and that is mostly consistent with what the court represented 
to the Court on July 15, 2015 of last year. Id. Morris' counsel indicated the State had 
reserved the right to call Morris. Id. 
The State argues the court that the plea deal did not involve an agreement with the 
State to not call Morris and Morris was aware of that. Id. The State had offered Morris a 
different agreement which did indicate they would not call him but Morris did not elect to 
take that deal. Id. Morris did not take that offer because he was pleading to things that 
were a great severity. Id. The State believes that Morris took the offer knowing he may 
be called as a witness. Id. The State argues that at trial they are learning that Logue's 
defense is that he was not even present when they were anticipating the defense would be 
he was there but did not pull the trigger. Id. The State believes that Morris' testimony that 
he was there is more important now although the State never made an agreement not to call 
Morris. Id. The State argues that Morris' other argument is he should not testify due to 
fear and that the most important witnesses in this case are fearful. Id. It is not grounds to 
quash the subpoena. 
The State indicated it has a return of service for the subpoena and that Morris' letter 
to them clearly shows he received the subpoena. Id. at p. 10. Morris notified the State of 
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his receipt of the subpoena and protested. Id. The State argues he could have notified his 
attorney's at that time. Id. The State is not aware if Morris did this but the State notified 
his attorneys of the letter and his objection at the time. Id. Morris' counsel never asked 
for a copy of the subpoena. Id. State argues that Morris' other argument is the Fifth 
Amendment claim of privilege and the State has given Counsel the grant of immunity use 
and derivative use of immunity and this mitigates the Fifth Amendment claim of privilege 
and double jeopardy precludes that clam to at least the majority of the questions the State 
plans to ask. Id. 
Morris' counsel indicated that the State received Morris' objection on January 16, 
2015 and that he has just now seen the grant of use immunity document. Id. Court 
indicated it is not odd for the immunity of use agreement to be given to counsel on the day 
of trial and Counsel agrees the rule does allow for that. Id. Morris' counsel argues that 
there has to be some remedy given the totality of the circumstances, no copy of the 
subpoena, not proof of service filed with the court as of yet. Id. Counsel asks the court to 
give special attention and added weight to what the State told Morris' attorneys in 
chambers on July 15, 2014. Id. Counsel argues that the State did not intend to call Morris 
then and indicated if it did it would be for rebuttal purposes only. Id. 
After hearing argument, the court orally ruled there were four grounds alleged to 
quash the subpoena. Id. at p. 12. Court determined that there was no requirement that 
Morris' counsel receive the subpoena. Id. Court found that failure to file the return of 
service does not rise to grounds to quash the subpoena. Id. This failure can be cured and 
State is directed to file return of service today. Id. 
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The trial court determined that Morris received three (3) plea options. Id. One 
was to pied to certain crimes and the State would not call him, he rejected this offer. Id. 
Morris was offered to enter a plea to certain crimes and agreed to cooperate which he 
rejected as well. Id. at p. 13. Morris entered into an agreement that he would plead to 
certain crimes and the State would have the option to call him but he would be compelled 
to participate by the subpoena powers and this is what has occurred. Id. The court ruled 
that the record is clear that Morris may be called as a witness and the State used its 
discretion to call him by subpoena. Id. The Court was not persuaded that the subpoena in 
anyway violated the plea agreement that Morris entered. Id. 
The court determined that Morris may have genuine fears of retaliation if he testifies 
but it is not enough of a reason for the subpoena to be quashed. Id. A witnesses' exercise 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege is not to be evidence used in a criminal case and it is 
unprofessional for an attorney to call a witness to testify he knows will claim a valid 
privilege for purpose of impressing upon the jury that the privilege is to be claimed. Id. 
The court indicated that an attorney does not need to accept at face value every claim of 
privilege no matter how frivolous. Id. The court ruled it is sufficient to defeat the 
suggestion that a witness is being called for an improper purpose when an attorney calling 
his witness has an argument that the witness cannot validly make such claim. Id. at p. 14. 
The trial court then addressed Yuri Lara and his Fifth Amendment privilege before 
it addresses Morris' Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at p. 18. The court determined that 
Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. The court determined that Morris had no 
Fifth Amendment privilege because he pled guilty to criminal conduct relating to the 
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underlying offense that Logue had been charged with. Id. The court concluded Morris had 
been offered immunity for any collateral conduct surrounding these events. Id. The court 
determined that with respect to federal prosecution at best the "fear is fanciful and merely 
speculative especially given the well-established Petite policy and Morris"' pleas. Id. The 
court found that this case has no federal interest that has been demonstratively 
unvindicated. Id. at p. 19. This is especially true in that Morris' police statement denies 
him having any knowledge that Logue possessed a gun. Id. Based upon this statement 
testimony consistent with that statement would not incriminate Morris any further. Id. The 
court determined he had already incriminated himself to that extent. Id. Morris does 
possess relevant and material information in this matter and the State has an argument that 
he had no Fifth amendment privilege. Id. 
Morris was seated on the witness stand. Id. at p. 48. He indicated to the court that 
he had a chance to speak with his attorneys about being subpoenaed to testify. Id. at p. 49. 
The court informed Morris that he was under a trial subpoena to testify and that if he did 
not he could be found in contempt of court and serve up to thirty (30) days in jail and fined 
$1,000. Id. The court also informed him he could be charged with obstruction of justice 
or perjury, which are second degree felonies. Id. Morris then informed the court he was 
not going to testify. Id. at p. 51. Both the State and the defense proceed to ask Morris 
questions. Id. at p. 52. He refused to answer the questions and informed the court he would 
refuse to answer all questions. Id. at pp. 52-53. 
Based upon Morris' refusal to answer the questions, the court found that he was in 
direct contempt of court. Id. at p. 54. Morris was ordered to spend thirty (30) days in jail, 
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which would run consecutive to his prison term, and pay a $1,000 fine. Id. The court 
indicated that the State could screen the test and determine if any more charges would be 
filed against him. Id. The trial court again asked Morris if he was going to comply with 
the court's order to testify, to which he indicated he was not. Id. 
After the court's January 30th oral order from the Bench, the written Ruling and 
Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne Morris; Order of Commitment; Warrant in 
Aid of Commitment was entered on February 12, 2015. RL:02215. In such Order the trial 
court indicated that Morris had been offered immunity for his testimony, and that Morris 
refused to answer questions. RL:02215. Morris was seated on the stand and he refused to 
answer questions. Id. The trial court also indicated it had found that Morris had no Fifth 
Amendment privilege based upon the immunity offer, and that Morris was found in 
contempt of court for his failure to testify. Id. The trial court ordered that Morris pay 
$1,000 fine and serve thirty (30) days in the County jail for such contempt, consecutive to 
the time he was already serving in prison. RL:02214. On March 13, 2015 Notice of 
Appeal-Contempt of Court-in regard to Witness Darrell Wayne Morris was filed. 
RL:02254. 
C. Trial February 4, 2015 
1. Testimony of Brandon David Wright 
Brandon David Wright ('"Wright") testified that he had been in prison and at some 
point joined a prison gang. R002419: 117. He testified that when he left prison he told the 
gang he would no longer be associated with them. Id. Wright testified that he ended up 
back in prison because he started drinking and got three (3) DUI's in a two-and-a-half week 
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period. Id. at p. 118. He testified that Logue had spoken to him about Andy's death while 
they were incarcerated together and Logue was awaiting trial on this matter. Id. He 
testified that Logue and Morris were both members of this gang. Id. Wright testified that 
Morris was in superior position to Logue in the gang. Id. at p. 120. He testified that one 
of the conditions of the gang was that you help other members when asked and that you do 
not inform or testify against other members of the gang. Id. at p. 121. Wright testified if 
you did not do these things, you could be beaten up or seriously injured. Id. He testified 
that he never read any of the police reports related to this matter. Id. at p. 129. Wright 
testified that by testifying he was also violating a rule of the gang. Id. at p. 130. 
D. Trial February 6, 2015 
1. Testimony of Brayden Hathaway 
Brayden Hathaway ("Hathaway") testified he had been in prison since May 9, 
2011. R002421:74. He testified that he had been a cellmate of Logue's. Id. at p. 75. 
Hathaway testified that Logue had legal papers in his cell and that Wright came to the 
prison in March of 2014. Id. at p. 76. He testified that he saw Wright look at Logue's legal 
papers several times. Id. at p. 77. Hathaway testified that he had also looked at the papers. 
Id. at p. 99. 
E. The State Filed a Felony Obstructing Justice Charge Against Morris 
On or about April 29, 2015, the State filed an Information charging Morris with 
Obstructing Justice, a Second Degree Felony. This felony charge against Morris is based 
on the trial court's denial of the motion to quash, the refusal of Morris to testify against 
Logue, and the trial court holding Morris in contempt resulting in the Contempt Order. 
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Morris is appealing both the Contempt Order and the Denial of the Motion to Quash. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 indicates that a court may quash or modify a subpoena if it 
believes that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable. Morris was 
subpoenaed to testify at Logue's trial. Both Morris and Logue are members of the prison 
gang SAW. The rules of the gang prohibit the members from testifying against each other. 
If a member testifies they run a substantial risk of receiving serious bodily injury or even 
being killed by other gang members in retaliation. Morris testifying would have put him 
at such risk. Under UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 a subpoena may be quashed if compliance with 
such subpoena would be unreasonable. UT. R. CIV. P. 45 supplements this concept by 
indicating that, "[a]n order compelling compliance shall protect the person subject to or 
affected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm." The trial court erred in failing 
to quash the subpoena because the substantial risk of injury or death that Morris faced if 
he complied with the subpoena was unreasonable and placed him in harm; thus, it should 
have been quashed. 
Under the U.S. CONST. AMEND. Va person cannot be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against themselves. The subpoena served upon Morris by the State 
attempted to do exactly what the United States prohibits, which is to compel Morris to 
testify against himself. Morris has a privilege to not testify against himself under the Fifth 
Amendment. The U.S. Department of Justice Petite Policy is not law and is only a 
discretionary policy of the prosecuting arm of the federal government. Based upon this, 
the trial court erred in determining that Morris did not have any privilege to assert under 
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the Fifth Amendment in not testifying. Morris had the right under the Fifth Amendment 
to not testify and incriminate himself. Although he had reached a plea agreement in this 
matter, it is possible that his testimony could have raised new offenses that the State was 
not aware of, for which he could later be charged by the state or the federal government. 
Thus, he had the right to refuse to testify under such privilege and the trial court erred in 
determining otherwise. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE 
ISSUE OF MORRIS BEING AT SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF BODILY HARM 
OR DEATH IF HE TESTIFIED AS RAISED IN HIS MOTION TO QUASH. 
UT. R. C1v. P. 45 generally governs the procedure for subpoenas in cases throughout 
the State of Utah, stating as follows: 
Every subpoena shall: (a)(l)(A) issue from the court in which the action is 
pending; (a)(l)(B) state the title and case number of the action, the name of 
the court from which it is issued, and the name and address of the party or 
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena; (a)(l)(C) command each 
person to whom it is directed (a)(l)(C)(i) to appear and give testimony at a 
trial, hearing or deposition, ... (a)( I )(D) if an appearance is required, specify 
the date, time and place for the appearance ... (b)(l) A subpoena may be 
served by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the 
case. Service of a subpoena upon the person to whom it is directed shall be 
made as provided in Rule 4(d). (b)(2) If the subpoena commands a person's 
appearance, the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena shall 
tender with the subpoena the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage 
allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the United States, 
or this state, or any officer or agency of either, fees and mileage need not be 
tendered ... e)(3) The person subject to the subpoena or a non-party affected 
by the subpoena may object under Rule 37 if the subpoena: ... (e)(5) If 
objection is made, or if a party requests a protective order, the party or 
attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena is not entitled to compliance 
but may request an order to compel compliance under Rule 37(a). The 
objection or request shall be served on the other parties and on the person 
subject to the subpoena. An order compelling compliance shall protect the 
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person subject to or affected by the subpoena from significant expense or 
harm. The court may quash or modify the subpoena. If the party or attorney 
responsible for issuing the subpoena shows a substantial need for the 
information that cannot be met without undue hardship, the court may order 
compliance upon specified conditions. 
(Emphasis added). UT. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides more specifics with regard to subpoenas 
in criminal cases: 
(a)( 1) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before 
a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation 
or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is 
filed, the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the 
direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an information or indictment 
is to be tried ... An attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the 
action is pending may also issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the 
court ... (b) The court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would 
be unreasonable .... (c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall 
govern the content, issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those 
provisions are consistent with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(Emphasis added). In State v. Gonzales the Utah Supreme Court discusses the application 
of the rules of civil procedure in criminal matters, specifically addressing Rules 14 and 45 
set forth supra: 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are subject to some of the 
requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Prominent among these 
is civil rule 8l(e), which states, "[t]hese rules of [civil] procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 81 ( e ) .... 
The applicability of civil rule 81 cannot be determined by merely comparing 
rule titles, index entries, or the contents of the rules of criminal and civil 
procedure. Instead, our "applicable statute or rule" analysis obliges us to 
consider the text and purposes of the related statutes and rules, and thereby 
determine whether an applicable rule of civil procedure should be grafted 
into a rule of criminal procedure through civil rule 81. An inquiry central to 
this task is the assessment of what more a civil rule may permit or require 
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than the criminal rule on a similar topic, and what reasons, if any, justify the 
differences. 
The civil subpoena rules are both more comprehensive and more exacting 
than the criminal rules. For example, rule 14(b) states that a court may quash 
or modify a subpoena if compliance is "unreasonable," but provides no 
further guidance. Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b). In contrast, civil rules 45(c)(3)(A) 
and (B) each provide for four occasions when the court may quash or modify 
the subpoena, and provide direction for doing so. Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A), 
(B). Similarly, civil rule 45 expressly addresses the status of unsubpoenaed 
persons who are present in the courtroom whose testimony is sought, while 
criminal rule 14 does not. Criminal rule 14 also does not specify what 
information is required to appear on a subpoena, such as name or address, 
whereas civil rule 45(a) provides detailed instructions concerning the 
contents of any subpoena. 
Ibid., 2005 UT 72, ,i,i27, 29-30, 125 P.3d 878. After its analysis, the Gonzales court 
ultimately determined that "Rule 45(b )( 1 )(A)'s notification requirement applies to criminal 
matters where privileged information is at stake." Id. at ,i 41. 
Gonzales further stated that, "the right to cross-examine 'does not entail the right to 
harass, annoy, or humiliate [the] witness on cross-examination, nor to engage in repetitive 
questioning, nor to inquire into matters which would expose the witness to danger of 
physical harm."' Ibid., 2005 UT 72, iJ48, 125 P.3d 878, citing State v. Hacliford, 737 P.2d 
200, 203 (Utah 1987)( quoting State v. Chesnut, 621 P .2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980) ). In 
Piemonte v. United States it states that, "if two persons witness an offense---one being an 
innocent bystander and the other an accomplice who is thereafter imprisoned for his 
participation-the latter has no more right to keep silent than the former. The Government 
of course has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm." Ibid, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 
81 S.Ct. 1720 ( 1961 ). (Emphasis added). In Wang v. Reno it discusses that when a person 
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is in the custody of the State, the State has some responsibility for the person's safety and 
well-being as follows: 
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services., the 
Court held that 'when the State takes a person into his custody and holds 
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes some responsibility 
for his safety and general well-being." [footnote omitted] In so holding, the 
Court explained that when the government creates a special relationship 
with a person by placing him in a vulnerable situation, the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause obligates the government to 
provide for that person's basic needs and to protect him from 
deprivations of liberty. Id. 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 
103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Having placed Wang in custody, the government 
had an obligation to protect him from liberty deprivations he faced by 
virtue of his testimony in court .... Wang has proven facts sufficient to 
establish a violation of his liberty interest in personal security and thus of 
his due process rights secured by the Fifth Amendment. See Wood, 879 
F.2d at 591 n. 8., 
Ibid., 81 F.3d 808, 816-20 (9th Circuit) (1996). Alternative means of either obtaining 
information from witnesses or evidence have been utilized by investigators when there is 
a strong likelihood that the witnesses will be reluctant to testify, even under grant of 
immunity, because they fear retaliation. See, e.g., US. v. Mascarenas, 30 Fed.Appx. 784, 
793 (10 th Cir. 2002)(investigators sought ability to use wiretap where witnesses were co-
conspirators or feared retaliation and would likely accept contempt as an alternative). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-302(1) states that, "[w]hen a contempt is committed in 
the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished 
summarily. An order shall be made, reciting the facts occurring in the immediate view and 
presence of the court. The order shall state that the person proceeded against is guilty of a 
contempt and shall be punished as described in Section 78B-6-310." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78B-6-301(10) provides that contempt can include, " ... disobedience of a subpoena duly 
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served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness; ... " UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-
310 sets forth the punishment for contempt as imposition of a fine not exceeding $1,000, 
or incarceration in the county jail not to exceed 30 days, or both. "While imprisonment 
cannot be used to coerce evidence after a trial has terminated, ... , it is unquestioned that 
imprisonment for a definite term may be imposed to punish the contemnor in vindication 
of the authority of the court.'' Yates v. U.S., 355 U.S. 66, 72, 78 S.Ct. 128, 132, 2 L.Ed.2d 
95 (1957), citing Yates v. United States, 9 Cir. 227 F.2d 844; cf Campers v. Bucks Stove 
& Range Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 418,443,449, 31 S.Ct. 492,498, 501, 55 L.Ed.2d 797. 
Herein, Morris filed a Motion to Quash the State's subpoena commanding him to 
appear and testify at Logue' s trial. Morris filed such motion based on the fact that testifying 
against Logue put him at the risk of bodily harm from SAW members. Morris had a 
justifiable fear for his life, which was supported by another member's information provided 
to the prosecution and to the court through Logue's motion to exclude jailhouse snitch 
testimony 
At Logue's trial on January 30, 2015, Morris' counsel argued Morris became an 
adverse party when he pled, asking that Morris' plea negotiations be admitted as an 
exception under the rules of evidence to evidence Morris's deal with the State to not testify 
against Logue. R0001294:8. Morris' counsel indicated the State had reserved the right to 
call Morris, but that it was Morris' understanding they would not. Id. The State argued 
that the plea deal that included not testifying was rejected by Morris because of the severity 
of the crimes to which he would plead. Id. at p. 9. They argued that Morris accepted the 
plea knowing that he could be called to testify. Id. 
28 
• 
' 
The State indicated it had a return of service for the subpoena and that Morris' letter 
to them clearly shows he received the subpoena. Id. at p. 10. Morris' counsel points out 
that no return of service has been filed with the court. Id. at p. 11. Morris' counsel also 
pointed out that weight should be given to what the State told Morris on July 15, 2014, that 
it did not intend to call Morris as a witness unless it was in their rebuttal case. Id. 
Information on the record about letters received from Wright, and testimony given 
by Wright at trial indicated Morris and Logue were members of the SAW prison gang. 
Wright's independently evidenced fear of the SAW members. Wright wrote in a letter to 
prosecutors that SAW ordered him to carry out a stabbing, even though he was retired from 
the gang, informing him that if he did not do it then they "would have to send me out 
sideways." RL 1510-11. They informed Wright that they had already ordered two other 
stabbings carried out within the prison walls in the last year, and they provided a shank to 
Wright to carry out the order. Id. Wright had to act as though he was carrying out the 
order by creating an obvious commotion to get officers to stop it, and he walked away with 
a charge for possession of a shank. Id. Wright sought protection in exchange for his 
testimony, evidencing a paranoia about testifying against another member. Id. Wright 
asked not just for immunity, but for a transfer to Olympus, noting he would be on gang hit 
lists here and wanted to leave Utah for good. Id. 
UT. R. CIV. P. 45(e)(5) dictates that the trial court compelling Morris' compliance 
with the subpoena herein "shall protect" him from "significant ... harm." This rule of civil 
procedure applies to these criminal proceedings given that there is no other applicable 
statute or rule defining the "unreasonable" verbiage utilized in UT. R. CRIM. P. 14(b). See, 
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UT. R. C1v. P. 81(e). Rule 45(e)(5) applied to these proceedings would not conflict with 
any statutory or constitutional requirement. Id.; Gonzales at ,r,r27, 29-30. Gonzales 
recognized particularly that Rule 45(e)(5) was more comprehensive and exacting than Rule 
l 4(b ). Id. It is likely that this was due to their individual purposes. The purpose behind 
Rule 45(e)(5) is to provide a limitation on the subpoena powers to the extent that 
compliance would not harm an individual, placing a burden on the State to ensure their 
protection. The purpose of Rule l 4(b) is similar but broadly states that the subpoena cannot 
be "unreasonable" in any fashion. Thus, Rule 45(e)(5) provides a more particularized idea 
of the type of unreasonableness that would not be tolerated through the subpoena powers. 
Given the nature of criminal proceedings to produce potential for substantial bodily harm 
or death through retaliation for testimony more readily than civil proceedings, it is 
appropriate that Rule 45(e)(5) apply to criminal procedures to protect witnesses. The 
Gonzales court ultimately determined that "Rule 45(b)(l)(A)'s notification requirement 
applies to criminal matters where privileged information is at stake." Id. at ,r 41. Similarly, 
this Court should graft Rule 45(e)(5) into Rule 14(b), particularly so as to ensure that the 
government's duty is articulated. 
The United States Supreme Court law recognizes the duty the State has to ensure it 
has protected its potential witnesses. See, Piemonte, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1720 
(1961). Although Piemonte recognized Morris' duty to testify, it also held that "[t]he 
Government of course has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm." Id. This is 
particularly true when that citizen is in State's custody, as Morris currently is with his 
incarceration from his plea. Wang, 81 F.3d at 816-20; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 
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S.Ct. at 1005. The State created a special relationship with Morris by placing him in 
a vulnerable situation in subpoenaing him to testify at Logue's trial, invoking the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause obligating the State to provide for 
Morris' basic needs and to protect him from harm. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 
S.Ct. at 1005. The State and trial court offered Morris no protection at all, and the trial 
court did not require them to do so prior to finding Morris in contempt for failing to testify, 
even though the issue of fear of retaliation and harm was raised below. With abundant 
knowledge of the substantial risk of bodily harm or death to Morris and others by the SAW 
prison gang, the State and trial court failed to inquire about transferring Morris to a safe 
location away from other SAW inmates at the Utah State Prison. For example, the State 
or trial court could have transferred Morris to a County Jail facility in order to protect 
Morris from such substantial risk of bodily harm or death but failed to do so. 
Gonzales informs us that Logue would not have had the right to confront and cross-
examine Morris to the extent that it would expose him to danger of physical harm. Ibid. at 
148, citing Hackford, at 203(quoting Chesnut at 1233). The State should not be afforded a 
greater ability to place Morris in danger of physical harm by directly examining him 
anymore than Logue would be able to do on cross-examination. A person's physical safety 
transcends the evidence that could be gleaned in testimony, at least to the extent that proper 
measures are offered and put in place to ensure they are protected in light of their testimony. 
Further, Morris' testimony appears to have been unnecessary since the jury convicted 
Logue without it. 
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The weight of Morris' testimony against the harm that could have been afforded as 
a result clearly evidenced that it was unnecessary for the State to procure his testimony for 
a conviction. Alternative means could have been utilized to obtain the information, of 
which some were, in order to protect Morris and dispel the fear of retaliation. See, e.g., 
Mascarenas at 793. Other witnesses testified to the information that would have been 
asked of Morris, and much information was gleaned from Wright, who was a jailhouse 
snitch who had apparent first-hand confession from Logue. Overall, Morris' testimony was 
unnecessary to Logue's conviction and simply sought after by the State to harass Morris. 
For these and other purposes argued herein, Morris sought to quash the subpoena, 
citing gang retaliation as "significant harm" from which he was requiring protection. UT. 
R. CRIM. P. l 4(b) further provided that the court could quash the subpoena on grounds that 
it was unreasonable to expect Morris to testify against Logue. Morris' plea agreement did 
not require it of him and the State assured him that they likely would not call him as a 
witness in the case. It was unreasonable, given the weight of the other evidence they had 
against Logue, to expect Morris to place his life in danger to provide what little extra they 
think they may have obtained from him-information that was unnecessary to conviction 
as is apparent from the fact that Logue was convicted without it. 
Because Morris appeared before the court to decline testifying, it was proper to have 
determined the matter of contempt summarily; however, his prior written Motion to Quash 
warranted further examination by evidentiary hearing into the fear of retaliation prior to its 
entry. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-302(1); §78B-6-301(10). Morris was punished with 
contempt of court, incarceration for 30 days to be run consecutive to his current sentence, 
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and a $1,000 court fine. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-310. The trial has concluded, making 
Morris' punishment in vindication of the authority of the court. Yates, 355 U.S. at 72, 78 
S.Ct. at 132, citing Yates, 227 F.2d 844; cf Campers, 221 U.S. at 449, 31 S.Ct. at 501. 
Such vindication was at the discretion of the trial court; however, the trial court erred in 
ordering contempt herein due to the fact that the weight of Morris' testimony coupled with 
the fear of prison gang retaliation did not require vindication, but instead relief by way of 
it quashing his subpoena. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MORRIS HAD 
NO FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE TO ASSERT. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V discusses an individual's right to not be compelled to be a 
witness against themselves as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of 
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
In American Fork City v. Crosgrove the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "the 
manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the United 
States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind from a party 
or a witness." Ibid., 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). The Supreme Court later 
determined that, "the Fifth Amendment right to silence is a comprehensive privilege that 
can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, 
investigatory or adjudicatory." State v. Butt, 2012 UT 34, ,it l , 284 P.3d 605. "[T]he 
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privilege against self-incrimination (the privilege) embodied in the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution protects "an accused only from being compelled to testify 
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature." State v. VanDyke, 2009 UT App 369, i\26, 223 P.3d 465, citing 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 
Our United States Supreme Court has "consistently held that the necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist 
the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court's 
order to produce prior to any review of that order; and resistance to that order with the 
concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal." 
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460, 95 S.Ct. 584, 592, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975), citing 
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (citing 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Alexander 
v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906); cf United States v. Blue, 
384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966); Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 
121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 77 S.Ct. 
1332, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442 (1957)). 
This method of achieving precompliance review is particularly appropriate 
where Fifth Amendment privilege [footnote omitted] against self-
incrimination is involved. The privilege has ancient roots [ citations omitted] 
This Court has always broadly construed its protection to assure that an 
individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used 
against him as an accused in a criminal action. [ citations omitted]. The 
protection does not merely encompass evidence which may lead to criminal 
conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the 
chain of evidence which an individual reasonably believes could be used 
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against him in a criminal prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 
479,486, 71 S.Ct. 814,818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). In view of the place this 
privilege occupies in the Constitution and in our adversary system of justice, 
as well as the traditional respect for individual that undergirds the privilege, 
the procedure described in Ryan seems an eminently reasonable method to 
allow precompliance review. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
In US. v. Barrett, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the Double Jeopardy 
Clause portion of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, which is assistive to this 
case: 
"The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause states that, '[n]o person 
shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb."' United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475,478 (7 th Cir. 2003)(quoting U.S. 
Const. amend. V). "The Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as 
prohibiting not only multiple punishments for the same crime, but also 
multiple prosecutions as well." Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 
688, 695-96, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993)). "One significant 
limitation exists, however, to the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.'" Id. "It is known as the dual sovereignty doctrine, under which courts 
recognize that the Clause is no bar to serial prosecution and punishment 
undertaken by separate soverign entities." Id. ( citing Health v. Alabama, 4 74 
U.S. 82, 88, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985)). The Supreme Court has 
explained that the doctrine "is founded on the common-law conception of 
crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government," and "[w]hen 
a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns 
by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offences."' 
Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433. In other words, the "doctrine is best 
understood ... not as an exception to double jeopardy, but rather as a 
manifestation of the maxim that where a defendant violates the law of two 
sovereigns, he commits separate offenses." United States v. Angleton, 314 
F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2002)(italics in original). 
Ibid., 496 F.3d 1079, 1117-8 (10th Cir. 2007). Recently, in US. v. Roberto Miromantes 
Roman, the United States District Court for the District of Utah applied the dual 
sovereignty doctrine to defeat defendant's request for dismissal of a charge in federal court 
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on grounds of Double Jeopardy for a murder for which Roman was acquitted by a jury in 
state court. Ibid., Case No. 2:13-cr-00602-DN-DBP-l, U.S. District Court Judge David 
Nuffer presiding. In Roman, Judge Nuffer ruled that, "although Mr. Roman cites many 
academic works that criticize the dual sovereignty doctrine, and makes the argument that 
the doctrine is contrary to the view espoused by the Framers at the inception of this 
country's foundation, he fails to cite any case overruling the doctrine." See, Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motions to Dismiss Under Double Jeopardy 
Clause, filed September 30, 2014 (the "Roman Denial"). Judge Nuffer concluded that, 
"[t]herefore, his request to eradicate the doctrine from American jurisprudence cannot be 
granted by this court since 'lower courts are required to follow the precedential decisions 
of higher courts on questions of law."' Id. at pp. 5-6, citing B. T ex. rel. G. T v. Santa Fe 
Public Schools, 506 F.Supp.2d 718, 724-25 (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 
( 1982)). After being acquitted by a state jury trial of a state murder charge, Roman was 
criminally charged in federal court with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-racketeering, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1111-murder, and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1117---conspiracy to murder. 
On July 15, 2014 the Second Amended Information was entered for Morris. It 
charged Morris with Manslaughter, a second degree felony; Obstructing Justice, a second 
degree felony; and Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by 
Restricted Person, a third degree felony. RM:01234. On July 15, 2014 the Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel was filed 
("Plea Agreement"), RM:R01244. On July 15, 2014, the Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment was entered. RM:R01228. Thereafter, Morris was subpoenaed to testify 
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against Logue; however, Morris had also been a co-defendant in the crime charged against 
Logue and had entered a plea deal with the State. Morris argued that he should not have 
to testify based upon his right under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Morris appeared and refused to testify, citing not only possible harm or death because of 
his gang involvement, as is discussed more specifically supra. In his previously filed 
Motion to Quash, Morris also invoked his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to not 
incriminate himself. Morris did not wish to be compelled to give testimony that would 
incriminate him in any other crime that could be charged against him with regard to the 
incident. 
Morris maintained the right to not be compelled to be a witness against himself by 
testifying in Logue's criminal trial. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; Butt at in 1. Morris and Logue 
were codefendants charged separately with respect to the same incident involving the death 
of another. Any information that the State intended to elicit from Morris on the stand in 
Logue's trial would have necessarily been of the "self-incriminating kind." Crosgrove at 
1072. Testifying in Logue's trial would have "provide[d] the State with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature" from Morris, and was thus subject to his Fifth 
Amendment rights. VanDyke at i!26, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826. 
Morris was faced with the impossible choice of either complying with the subpoena 
and testifying against Logue to his own detriment with regard to the fear of physical harm 
as well as his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or resistance to that order 
with the possibility of being found in contempt and being charged by the State with 
Obstruction of Justice, a second degree felony. Maness, 419 U.S. at 460, 95 S.Ct. at 592, 
37 
citing Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-533, 91 S.Ct. at 1582 (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. 323, 60 
S.Ct. 540); Alexander, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356; cf Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416; 
Di Bella, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654; Carroll, 354 U.S. 394, 77 S.Ct. 1332. Morris should 
not have been compelled to produce evidence or information that later could either be used 
against him as an accused in a criminal action or which would furnish a link in the chain 
of evidence which could reasonably be used against him in a separate criminal prosecution. 
See, id., citing Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818. 
The idea of a separate criminal prosecution is not hypothetical in nature. While the 
State and the trial court believed that the granting of state immunity was sufficient to moot 
any Fifth Amendment claim Morris may have with regard to self-incrimination, they were 
mistaken. Morris is subject to possible prosecution in another sovereignty-federal court-
for the crime to which he plead guilty in state court. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111 and 
1117. Although normally this would rise to a Double Jeopardy violation, the dual 
sovereignty doctrine would allow him to be tried and convicted in both, as noted by our 
10th Circuit. Barrett at 1117-8; see e.g., Long at 478, U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, Dixon, 509 
U.S. at 695-96, 113 S.Ct. 2849; Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433. The crimes to which 
Morris plead in state court is considered a crime against the sovereignty of the 
government-both state and federal. Id., citing Heath, 474 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 433; 
Angleton at 771. 
Additionally, gang members are oftentimes prosecuted by the federal government 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1961-68, and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering ("VICAR") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
38 
' 
Ill 
• 
' 
1959, without offending double jeopardy principles. Pursuant to the Dual Sovereignty 
Doctrine, the double jeopardy principle isn't violated by successive prosecutions or 
cumulative punishment for RICO and VICAR offenses and state offenses that are charged 
as predicate racketeering acts underlying the RICO and VICAR offenses even if they arose 
from the same conduct and had the same elements. In that regard, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive federal and state 
prosecutions for offenses arising from the same acts. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 
U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The rationale underlying 
this rule lies in the concept of "dual sovereignty," which the Supreme Court has 
summarized as follows: 
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, 
capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory .... 
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace 
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. 
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be 
punished by each .... Here the same act was an offense against the State of 
Washington, because a violation of its law, and also an offense against the 
United States under the National Prohibition Act. The defendants thus 
committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction by a court 
of Washington of the offense against that state is not a conviction of the 
different offense against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382. 
The Supreme Court also has explicitly held that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is 
not defeated even where there is substantial cooperation between the two sovereignties 
involved. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 319-320; Barkus, 359 U.S. at 122-123. Indeed, the 
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Supreme Court has noted that cooperation between the state and federal government "is 
the conventional practice between [state and federal] prosecutors throughout the country," 
and was perfectly proper. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 122-123. 
In accordance with the foregoing authority, every federal court of appeals that has 
decided the issue has held that under the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and double jeopardy 
principle are not violated by charging state offenses on which the defendant previously had 
been acquitted or convicted in state prosecutions as RICO predicate racketeering acts. See, 
e.g., United States v. Giovanelli, 945 F.2d 479, 491-93 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386,396 
(2d Cir, 1989); United States v. Russotti, 717 F .2d 27, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1983 ), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1022 (1984 ); United States v. Aleman, 609 F .2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 ( 1980). 
This is not just a far-reaching possibility for Morris to be charged in federal court. 
Such courses have been taken recently within the State of Utah at the federal level. See, 
Roman, supra. Federal Judge Nuffer, U.S. District Court for Utah, ruled against Roman's 
request for dismissal based on Double Jeopardy grounds, citing the dual sovereignty 
doctrine as support for the Court's decision that Roman could be tried on a charge of 
murder to which he was actually acquitted in district court. See, Roman Denial. As Judge 
Nuffer pointed out, Morris is subject to this doctrine until the United States Supreme Court 
overrules it, which had not occurred as of the decision in that matter, nor has it occurred 
yet. If Morris had testified against Logue, and that testimony was used to bring charges 
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against him in federal court, Morris would not have an argument for Double Jeopardy in 
eradication of the doctrine from American jurisprudence due to the doctrine of vertical 
stare decisis. Roman Denial at pp. 5-6, citing B. T at 724-25 (citing Hutto at 375). The 
only means by which to protect Morris' rights was to allow him to plead his Fifth 
Amendment rights, which remained intact given the collateral consequences possibly 
attending federal charges. 
In Morris, Judge Pullan cited generally to the following U.S. Department of Justice 
Petite Policy in the trial court's ruling that Morris did not have a Fifth Amendment right to 
refuse to testify in the Logue trial: 
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, 
following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same 
act(s) or transaction(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are satisfied: 
first, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior 
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, 
applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the 
government must believe that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal 
offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain 
and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact. In addition, there is a 
procedural prerequisite to be satisfied, that is, the prosecution must be 
approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. 
Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy ("Petite Policy"), United States Attorneys 
Manual, Title 9: Criminal, 9-2.031 (1 ). 
The trial court ruled that the Petite Policy and Morris' plea agreement would have 
prevented a "fanciful and merely speculative" federal dual-sovereign prosecution. 
However, the Petite Policy is discretionary by the prosecuting arm of government. The 
Petite Policy is not law. Rather, it is "merely an internal guideline for exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review." United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 
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718, 725 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Gruttadauria, 439 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (U.S. 
District Court, E.D. New York 2006). In 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that "'[t]he Petite policy 'is merely a housekeeping provision of the Department [of 
Justice]' that, 'at most,' serves as 'a guide for the use of the Attorney General and the 
United States Attorneys in the field, and thus does not confer any enforceable rights upon 
criminal defendants."' United States v. Barrett, 496 F. 3d 1079, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(inside citations omitted). Taken to its logical extension, the Petite Policy does not confer 
an enforceable Fifth Amendment or Double Jeopardy protection for criminal defendants 
that they will not be prosecuted by a dual sovereign entity for crimes defendants pled guilty 
to in a state court. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that Morris' plea and 1-15 year 
concurrent prison sentence did not vindicate all of the state or federal interests in Morris' 
case given that the co-defendant, Danny Leroy Logue, was convicted at trial on all counts 
and was sentenced to serve life without parole at the Utah State Prison. The large disparity 
in the co-defendants' sentences -- for arguably equal culpability -- lends credence to the 
federal government's interest in prosecuting Morris just as Mr. Roman was charged for a 
serious crime after the state case was conclude. 
Thus, like Mr. Roman, Morris and other similarly-situated state defendants are at 
risk of a dual-sovereign prosecution by federal prosecutors. Although the State of Utah 
offered immunity to Morris, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not. Nonetheless, even with 
State immunity, the State and trial court failed to address Morris' safety and harm concerns 
regarding SAW prison gang retaliation, as argued more particularly supra. 
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Morris had the right under the Fifth Amendment to not testify in any criminal 
proceeding that would cause him to be a witness against himself. It was not possible for 
him to testify in Logue's trial without incriminating himself, subjecting himself to an 
unreasonable and substantial risk of physical harm or death, and producing information 
that later could subject him to federal criminal action by direct evidence or by a simple link 
in evidence. Morris' testimony could have led to other charges in another sovereignty that 
maintains the ability to charge him without violating Double Jeopardy. Under the Fifth 
Amendment, Morris was not required to testify if it would lead to incriminating him. 
Cosgrove at 1072. Morris had the right to claim such privilege because it protects him 
from providing the State with information upon which further charges could be filed 
against him in state or federal court. Butt at ill 1, VanDyke at i!26. He invoked this right 
as a protection; however, the trial court erroneously denied him such right by finding him 
in contempt, failing to protect him from a substantial risk of harm or death, with the trial 
court abusing its discretion by finding that Morris did not have a remaining Fifth 
Amendment privilege after the granting of immunity by the State. Such decision must be 
reversed in support of protecting Morris' rights. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Morris requests that this Court reverse his contempt of court 
conviction, reverse the trial court' s denial of the motion to quash of the Morris subpoena, 
and remand this matter with instructions for the trial court to dismiss, with prejudice, the 
State' s current charge of Obstruction of Justice, a second degree felony, and grant any 
further relief it deems necessary. 
43 
DATED this 30th day ofNovember, 2015. -\ . 
/ ' ' ' ·. --·----:--~-- '' ----- ~· r· . 
Neil~o~s~n -- i , 
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Addendum '""A'"" 
Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell 
Wayne Morris, dated February 12, 2015 
FILED 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
rrr, ~ 2 'JO,~ 
r t.rJ 1 <- , n 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ~ih DIS 1n ,c r ";. TAT[ or UT•M 
VTAl'f CCV'l'T '-' 
ST ATE OF UT AH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORR.IS, 
Witness. 
RULING AND ORDER -
CONTEMPT OF COURT RE: DARRELL 
\VA YNE MORRIS 
CascNo.111401543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
This matter comes before the court during the jury trial in the above captioned case. On 
January 30, 2015, day seven of that jury trial, the State called Darrell Wayne Morris to testify. 
Mr. Morris was under subpoena and represented by Gregory Stewart and Neil Skousen. Before 
taking the witness stand and outside the presence of the jury, the State offered Mr. Morris use 
immunity for his testimony. Mr. Morris discussed this with his counsel, but refused to testify in 
this case. Mr. Morris was then brought in by the Department of Corrections and seated in the 
witness stand. After taking the witness stand in the presence of the jury and being directed by the 
Court to testify in this case. Mr. Morris refused to answer any questions. 
Outside the presence of the jury, the Court found that with that grant of immunity Mr. 
Morris had no 5th Amendment privilege not to testify, and that if he refused to testify he would 
be held in contempt of court and punished as prescribed in § 788-6-310, and could be subject to 
prosecution for obstruction of justice and perjury. Mr. Morris indicated that it \Vas still his 
intention not to testify. The Court found Mr. Morris in direct contempt of court. Pursuant to § 
" 
• 
788-6-310, the Court ordered Mr. Morris to pay a$ I 000 fine and to serve 30 days in the county 
jail, to run consecutively to the time he is currently serving in prison. 
Consistent with the Court·s verbal ruling, and pursuant to§ 78B-6-302, the Court hereby 
FINDS and ORDERS: 
• Darrell Wayne Morris is guilty of contempt in the immediate view and presence 
of the Court; 
• Pursuant to§ 78B-6-310, Mr. Morris is ordered to pay a S 1000 fine and serve 30 
days in the county jail, consecutive to the time he is currently serving in prison. 
DATED this /tl day of February, 2015. 
• 
• 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS, 
Witness. 
WARRANT IN AID OF 
COMMITTMENT 
Case No. 111401543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
THE STA TE OF UT AH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE ST A TE OF UT AH: 
On January 30, 2015, Darrell Wayne Morris was found in direct contempt of court under 
Utah Code§ 78B-6-302. (See Ruling and Order-Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne Morris, 
Case No. 11 1401543, Feb. 12, 2015). 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE COMMANDED to arrest DARRELL WAYNE 
MORRIS upon his release from the Utah State Prison to serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail 
for Contempt of Court . 
DATEDthis /4=. dayofFebruary,2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
" 
, 
' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAHCOUNT~STATEOFUTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS, 
Witness. 
ORDER OF COMMITMENT 
Case No. 111401543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
Darrell Wayne Morris was found guilty of direct contempt of court under Utah Code § 
78B-6-302 on January 30, 2015. (See Ruling and Order - Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne 
Morris, Case No. 111401543, Feb. 12, 2015). 
Pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-6-310, Mr. orris is ordered to pay a $1000 fine and serve 30 
days in the Utah County Jail upon his release from the Utah State Prison. 
DATEDthis /_,;:- dayofFebruary,2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
• 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 111401543 by the method and on the date specified. 
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MANUAL 
MANUAL 
MANUAL 
MANUAL 
MANUAL 
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CURTIS L LA.~SON curtisl~utahcounty.gov 
RY.P.N B MCBRIDE ryanm~utahcounty.gov 
NEIL SKOUSEN Ndskousen@aol.com 
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UTAH STATE PRISON marialister~utah.gov 
UTA.q COUNTY JAIL jailrecords@utahcounty.gov 
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Deputy Court Clerk 
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